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COMMENT
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S POLICY OF
DEFERRING TO ARBITRATION
JAMES I. BRIGGS, JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective-bargaining agreements between private employers and
unions usually contain provisions governing the procedure for the
arbitration of unfair labor practice complaints. When an unfair la-
bor practice dispute arises, must the parties process the dispute
through the contractual arbitration process and accept the arbitra-
tor's determination, or, alternatively, does the complainant have
the option to bypass the contractual procedure and petition the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for resolution of the dis-
pute? A third possibility is that the party receiving an unfavorable
result in the arbitration process could obtain a second bite at the
dispute resolution apple by then bringing the dispute before the
NLRB. After years of vacillation by the Board as to which forum
should resolve these disputes, the NLRB has announced standards
for determining whether it will resolve the dispute itself or require
that the dispute be settled by the contractual arbitration
procedures.
In United Technologies Corp.1 and Olin Corp.,2 the NLRB
broadened its policy on deferral to arbitration. In United Technol-
ogies, the Board held that the NLRB's processes will be stayed in
favor of the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures volunta-
rily invoked by the parties.3 In Olin Corp., the Board concluded
that, if the arbitral proceeding satisfies the standards given in
Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 4 and the arbitrator adequately con-
siders the unfair labor practice issues, the Board will defer to the
award given in the arbitration proceeding.5 The Board thus over-
ruled its 1977 decision in General American Transportation
1. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
2. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
3. 268 N.L.R.B. at 560.
4. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
5. 268 N.L.R.B. at 576-77.
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Corp.,' in which it had sharply restricted its policy of deferring to
the contractual grievance-arbitration machinery.
This Comment discusses the development of the Board's policy
of deferring grievances to arbitration rather than processing them
itself, and the acceptance by the courts of the deferral to volunta-
rily contracted grievance-arbitration procedures.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NLRB's POLICY ON DEFERRAL TO
ARBITRATION
Congressional intent regarding the use of arbitration is ex-
pressed in Title 29 of the United States Code: "Final adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bar-
gaining agreement."'7 However, section 10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) s expressly provides that an arbitral pro-
ceeding and award resolving unfair labor practice issues does not
preclude the Board from also resolving those same issues.9
The NLRB's policy on deferral to arbitration consists of two
parts. The first part involves the deferral to the arbitration process
itself: Whether the arbitration machinery in the contract between
the union and the employer must be exhausted before the Board's
jurisdiction can be invoked. The second part involves the deferral
to the award made during the arbitration process: Whether the
Board will determine the merits of the case or defer to the arbitra-
tion award and dismiss the action.
6. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
7. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 203(d), 161 Stat. 136, 154
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982)).
8. "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unfair labor practice (listed in section [8 of the Act]), affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. . . ." Id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
9. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925 (1962), affirmed sub nom. Ramsey
v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964); see, e.g., NLRB v.
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods.,
146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945). In Hershey Chocolate
Corp., the Third Circuit believed that deferral, rather than rejection, by the Board of the
arbitration decision "would have resulted in the effectuation of the final adjustment policy
declared desirable by Section 203(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act." 297 F.2d at
293-94.
NLRB ARBITRATION
A. Deferral to the Arbitration Process
In the 1943 case of Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,10 the NLRB de-
termined that if the statutory policy of "encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining"1 was to be implemented,
then the Board's jurisdiction should not be exercised until the
rights and remedies under the contract between the labor organiza-
tion and the employer was exhausted. If the NLRB agreed prema-
turely to determine whether the disputes over the meaning and ad-
ministration of collective bargaining agreements constituted unfair
labor practices, then the Board's interference in the contractual
collective bargaining process would encourage unions and employ-
ers to abandon their arbitration efforts and defer their contract ad-
ministration to the Board."
Even though the presence of a contractual arbitration procedure
does not prevent the NLRB from exercising its jurisdiction, the
Board in its discretion will defer disputes to arbitration when it
determines that arbitration is appropriate. 3 In Jos. Schlitz Brew-
ing Co.,"' the Board held that it should defer the issue of an em-
ployer's unilateral action to the arbitration process when (1) arbi-
tration is clearly provided for in the contract, (2) a substantial
claim of contractual privilege, not a design to undermine the
union, is the basis for the employer's action, and (3) arbitration
will apparently resolve the unfair labor practice and the contract
interpretation issue in a manner compatible with the NLRA's
purposes. 5
In 1971, the NLRB in Collyer Insulated Wire"6 deferred to the
arbitration machinery an alleged violation of section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA.1 7 By deferring to the parties' agreement to arbitrate dis-
putes, the Board merely gave full effect to the collective bargaining
contract. 8 The NLRB held the union and the employer "to their
bargain by directing them to avoid substituting the Board's
10. 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 44 (1943), enforced in pertinent part, Consoli-
dated Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
11. 12 L.R.R.M. at 45.
12. Id.
13. [Lab. Rel. Expeditor] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX-31 (1985).
14. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
15. Id. at 142.
16. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
17. Id. at 839; National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) ("(a)
... It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees...").
18. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 558.
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processes for their own mutually agreed-upon method for dispute
resolution."'19 Five particular circumstances in Collyer favored
deferral to arbitration: (1) a long and productive collective-bar-
gaining relationship, (2) an absence of a claim that the employer
harbored animosity toward the employees' exercise of their pro-
tected rights, (3) the dispute was clearly covered by the arbitration
agreement, (4) the asserted willingness of the employer to arbitrate
the dispute, and (5) the excellent suitability of the dispute to reso-
lution by arbitration because the center of the dispute was the con-
tract and its meaning.20
In the following year, in National Radio Co.," the Board ex-
tended to NLRA sections 8(a)(1), 2 8(a)(3), 23 8(b)(1)(A), 24 and
8(b) (2)25 its policy of deferring to contractual arbitration proce-
dures even though the arbitrator's resolution of the contractual is-
sues would not necessarily resolve the unfair labor practice dis-
pute.26 However, the NLRB noted its belief that resolution of the
contractual dispute would also resolve the unfair labor practice
dispute.27 The Board thus asserted that an unfair labor practice
could be remedied either in a statutory forum (before the Board)
or in a contractual forum (before an arbitrator). The Board denied
that it was abdicating its responsibility of resolving unfair labor
19. Id.; see also Lab. Rel. Expediter, supra note 13, at LRX-33 (the dispute in Collyer
was deferred under the contract's arbitration procedure because the dispute was essentially
"over the terms and meaning of a collective bargaining contract").
20. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
21. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
22. "(a) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7].
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
23. "(a) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . (3) by discrimi-
nation in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . Id. § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
24. "(b) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]
..... " Id. § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). This section was not mentioned by the
Board in National Radio Co., but it is the union counterpart to section 8(a)(1). See, e.g.,
General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 811 (1977) (Chairman Murphy, concurring).
25. "(b) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) . . . or to discriminate against an employee .... " National
Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982). This section was not mentioned
by the Board in National Radio Co., but it is the union counterpart to section 8(a)(3). See,
e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 811 (Chairman Murphy, concurring).
26. 198 N.L.R.B. at 531.
27. Id. at 532.
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practice disputes. It reasoned instead that, by allowing the parties
to proceed under their own contractual process, "both the collec-
tive relationship and the Federal policy favoring voluntary arbitra-
tion and dispute settlement" would be fostered.2"
Developing its policy of allowing the collective-bargaining con-
tract to control, the Board ruled in United Aircraft Corp.2 9 that
when the "contract makes available a quick and fair means for the
resolution of the dispute,"30 the union is required to utilize the vol-
untarily contracted arbitration machinery before the NLRB's juris-
diction is invoked. The Board refused to settle, prior to arbitra-
tion, the day-to-day disputes between employees and supervisors.
Minor and isolated occurrences of unfair labor practices did not
establish an unwillingness on the part of the employer to follow
the contractual procedures for dispute resolution.3 1 However, in
1977, in General American Transportation Corp.,32 the Board
overruled National Radio Co.33 and held that it would no longer
defer any unfair labor practice issues to the contractual arbitration
process because the NLRB has a statutory duty to resolve unfair
labor practice disputes involving the statutory rights of employ-
ees.3 4 NLRB Chairman Murphy, in a concurring opinion, posited
the determinative factor for refusing to defer as being that the "ar-
bitrator's resolution of the contract issue will not dispose of the
unfair labor practice allegation" that the conduct "interfered with,
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by section 7 of the Act." 35 She disagreed with the plu-
rality's opinion that the Board lacks the power to defer, but be-
lieved that the Board has the discretion to defer to arbitration
disputes arising under section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)3" from the par-
ties' collective-bargaining agreement.37 When the dispute concerns
whether the conduct allegedly in violation of section 8(a)(5) or
28. Id. at 531.
29. 204 N.L.R.B. 879 (1972), enforced sub nom. Lodges 700, 743, 1746, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. 204 N.L.R.B. at 880 n.4.
31. Id. at 880.
32. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977) (plurality opinion by Members Fanning and Jenkins).
33. Id. at 810 n.7.
34. Id. at 808; see also id. at 810-11 (Chairman Murphy, concurring).
35. Id. at 811 (Chairman Murphy, concurring) (footnote omitted).
36. "(b) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative
of his employees subject to the provisions of section [9(a) of this Act] . National La-
bor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1982).
37. Id. at 810.
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8(b)(3) is permitted by the contract, then the dispute is "emi-
nently suited to the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract
issue by an arbitrator will, as a rule, dispose of the unfair labor
practice issue. '38 Contrary to the plurality's holding, Chairman
Murphy concluded that the Board will continue to defer to arbitra-
tion the alleged violations of section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) when the
dispute between the employer and the union is based on conduct
that is allegedly in derogation of the collective-bargaining con-
tract. 9 The two dissenters, Members Penello and Walther, re-
jected the reasons advanced for restricting the NLRB's policy on
deferral and believed that, when appropriate, the Board should
continue to defer to arbitration alleged violations of section
8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3). 40 A major-
ity of the Board, therefore, did agree to defer alleged violations of
section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)' 1 .
In 1984, however, in United Technologies Corp.,42 the NLRB
overruled General American Transportation and decided to defer
to the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures for alleged vio-
lations of section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 8(a)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and
8(b)(3) of the NLRA. The Board believed that General American
Transportation had emasculated the policy of deferral announced
in Collyer Insulated Wire by permitting parties to ignore their
contractual dispute resolution procedure and petition the NLRB
for remedial relief, thus defeating the statutory purposes of en-
couraging collective bargaining.4 3 The Board held that the policies
of the NLRA would best be effectuated by deferring, under the
principles of Collyer and National Radio, to the grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement:4"
It is fundamental to the concept of collective bargaining that
the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement are bound by the
terms of their contract. Where an employer and a union have vol-
untarily elected to create dispute resolution machinery culminat-
ing in final and binding arbitration, it is contrary to the basic
principles of the [NLRA] for the Board to jump into the fray
prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their disputes
38. Id. at 810-11.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 813-14 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting).
41. The majority consisted of Chairman Murphy, and Members Penello and Walther.
42. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
43. Id. at 559.
44. Id. at 560.
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through that machinery. For dispute resolution under the griev-
ance-arbitration process is as much a part of collective bargaining
as the act of negotiating the contract. . ... 5 [Otherwise, the par-
ties] . . . "could ignore an agreed-upon method of settling dis-
putes. Since in most cases deferring to arbitration will encourage
collective bargaining, the Board, in carrying out the Act's pur-
pose, should see that full play is given to the arbitral process."4
In 1985, in Spann Building Maintenance Co.,47 the NLRB reaf-
firmed the policy of deferring to the arbitration process expressed
in United Technologies Corp.48 The Board held that it is proper to
require the parties to settle the dispute in arbitration when the
contract clearly covers the issues comprising the unfair labor prac-
tice allegation and when there is no indication "that the grievance-
arbitration procedure has been or is likely to be unfair or irregular
or has produced or is likely to produce a result repugnant to the
Act.'4 The Board believed that General Dynamics Corp.50 com-
pelled it to defer the dispute to the arbitration process.5 1-
In General Dynamics Corp., the Board followed the policy an-
nounced in United Technologies Corp. and held that it would de-
fer to the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure when an em-
ployee withdrew the dispute from arbitration prior to completing
the grievance process. The Board concluded that deferral was ap-
propriate when the collective bargaining contract clearly encom-
passed the unfair labor practice issue, there was no indication that
the arbitration would be unfair or likely to produce a result repug-
nant to the Act, and the employee had voluntarily initiated the
grievance procedure. 52 To refuse to defer "would be in effect to
render meaningless both the contractual agreement of the parties
to establish a grievance-arbitration procedure and the statutory
45. Id. at 559 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that the "arbitration of
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
46. 268 N.L.R.B. at 559-60 (quoting Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 844
(1971)). The Board in United Technologies stated that it was simply holding "that where
contractual grievance-arbitration procedures have been invoked voluntarily we shall stay the
exercise of the Board's processes in order to permit the parties to give full effect to those
procedures." 268 N.L.R.B. at 560 n.17.
47. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209 (1985).
48. Id. at 1209.
49. Id. at 1210.
50. 271 N.L.R.B. 191 (1984).
51. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1210 n.3.
52. 271 N.L.R.B. at 189.
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policy of the Board, as expressed in United Technologies, to en-
courage the use of grievance-arbitration procedures. 53
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,54 the NLRB once again followed the
deferral policy announced in United Technologies Corp. and de-
ferred to the grievance-arbitration procedure for alleged violations
of section 8(a)(3). In Chevron, the Board deferred to an arbitra-
tor's award "because the contractual issue [was] factually parallel
to the unfair labor practice issue and the parties presented the ar-
bitration panel with facts relevant to resolving the issue."55
B. Deferral to the Arbitration Award
In attempting to encourage utilization of the arbitration process,
the NLRB has not only developed a policy of deferring to the arbi-
tration process itself but has also developed a policy of deferring to
and enforcing the resulting arbitration awards. 6 In Spielberg
Manufacturing Co.,57 the Board first announced its standard for
deferring to an arbitration award: (1) "the proceedings appear to
have been fair and regular," (2) "all parties had agreed to be
bound," and (3) "the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the [NLRA].15 8 The
Board believed that deferring to the arbitration award under these
circumstances would best serve the "desirable objective of encour-
aging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes." 59
Narrowing its deferral policy, the NLRB slowly began to develop
a fourth criterion of requiring the arbitrator to have considered the
unfair labor practice issue before the Board would defer to the ar-
bitration award. In 1961, in Monsanto Chemical Co.,60 the NLRB
53. Id. at 190.
54. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1238 (1985).
55. Id. at 1239.
56. See Malrite of Wisconsin, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 241 (1972), enforced in part, Local
Union No. 715, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lab.
Rel. Expediter, supra note 13, at LRX-32, 34. The Board in Malrite of Wisconsin held that
not only should the NLRB defer to both the arbitration process and the award when the
standards for deferral have been met, but that noncompliance with the award should not be
a concern of the Board. The Board reasoned that immediate access to the courts to enforce
the award is preferable to conducting an administrative procedure before seeking an en-
forceable decree in the courts. 198 N.L.R.B. at 242.
57. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
58. Id. at 1082.
59. Id.
60. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961). One commentator believes that the NLRB's acceptance of
the arbitrator's decision has become the exception and not the rule. See Van De Water, New
Trends in NLRB Law, 33 LAB. L.J. 635, 638 (1982).
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did not defer to the arbitration award when an arbitrator expressly
chose to ignore the unfair labor practice issue. The arbitrator be-
lieved that the dispute could be decided on grounds other than the
unfair labor practice issue. He therefore chose to leave the unfair
labor practice issues to the jurisdiction of the Board. However, the
Board reasoned that giving an arbitration award binding effect in
an unfair labor practice proceeding would not encourage voluntary
settlements or effectuate the policies of the NLRA when the award
"does not purport to resolve the unfair labor practice issue which
was before the arbitrator."6 In the 1963 case of Raytheon Co., 62
the NLRB refused to defer to an arbitration award when the par-
ties expressly limited the arbitrator's authority to the contract is-
sues, the arbitrator received no evidence on the unfair labor prac-
tice issue, and the arbitrator could not and did not resolve the
unfair labor practice issue.63 The Board held that the arbitrator
must consider the unfair labor practice issue and the fact that the
contract and statutory issues are factually parallel cannot be used
to show that the arbitrator must have resolved the unfair labor
practice issue. When the arbitrator " 'does not purport to resolve
the unfair labor practice issue which was before the arbitrator and
which is the very issue the Board is called upon to decide,'" the
Board's deferral to the arbitration award could not encourage the
voluntary settlement of disputes or effectuate the policies and pur-
poses of the NLRA.6 4 In 1972, in Airco Industrial Gases65 and
Yourga Trucking, Inc.,"6 the NLRB concluded that deferral would
be inappropriate unless there was at least some evidence that the
arbitrator had been presented with and had considered the unfair
labor practice issue.6 7
61. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099.
62. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), order set aside, Raytheon Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st
Cir. 1964) (insufficient evidence for Board's findings; Board did not affirmatively find an
improper reason for employee's discharge).
63. 140 N.L.R.B. at 884, 886.
64. Id. at 884 (quoting Monsanto, 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099); see also D.C. Int'l, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 1383, 1384 (1967) (the statutory issue must be considered by the arbitrator). In
International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), the Board deferred to an arbitration
award when the facts and issues presented to the arbitrator were essentially the same as
those before the Board and the legal conclusions of the arbitrator were not clearly repug-
nant to the purposes of the NLRA. Id. at 928.
65. 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
66. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
67. Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. at 928; Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. at
676-77.
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However, in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,8 the NLRB
relaxed its standard for deferring to arbitration awards. Deciding
that it had been insufficiently deferential to arbitration awards, the
Board adopted the standard expressed in the dissenting opinion in
Airco Industrial Gases"9 and the concurring opinion in Yourga
Trucking70 and held that it would defer to an arbitration award
even if there is no indication that the unfair labor practice issue
was considered or even presented to the arbitrator. Where the
facts underlying both the contractual and the unfair labor practice
issues are essentially the same, the Board reasoned that a arbitra-
tor's resolution of the contractual issue of whether a discharge was
for cause will necessarily involve a determination of the unfair la-
bor practice issue of whether the true reason for the action was
discriminatory. The arbitrator's resolution of the contractual issue
was therefore presumed to have also resolved the unfair labor prac-
tice issue.7 1
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stephenson v.
NLRB7 2 rejected the Board's conclusion in Electronic Reproduc-
tion Service as an "unjustifiable extension" of the Board's deferral
policy.7 s3 The court felt that the NLRB abdicated its obligation to
resolve unfair labor practices if the Board deferred to the arbitra-
tion award when definite proof was absent that the statutory issue
was presented to and "clearly decided" by the arbitrator.7 4 Defer-
ral upon this mere presumption in total absence of any evidence
68. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
69. 195 N.L.R.B. at 677 (Member Kennedy, dissenting).
70. 197 N.L.R.B. at 929 (Member Kennedy, concurring in result).
71. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 764. The Board believed that deferral here would prevent the
multiple litigation that Spielberg intended to prevent because the issue could not then be
raised before the NLRB following arbitration. In application, the Airco and Yourga deci-
sions tended to artificially separate the contractual issue to be resolved in arbitration from
the statutory issue to be resolved before the Board. This practice of separating the issues
would be detrimental to both the arbitration and the NLRB's process. The arbitration pro-
cess is therefore less likely to quickly and fairly resolve the dispute. The Board stated:
Instead, such an artificial separation of issues seems likely to lead . . . to piece-
meal litigation in whch a party may well prefer to have "two bites of the apple,"
trying part of the discharge case before the arbitrator but holding back evidence
material to its claim so as to be able to pursue the matter in yet another proceed-
ing before this Board.
Id. at 761. The Board, however, stated that it would not defer to arbitration when special
circumstances were shown to have precluded a full and fair opportunity for the complaining
party to present evidence of the alleged unfair labor practice. Id. at 764.
72. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 539.
74. Id. at 539-41.
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fails to meet the "clearly decided" criterion of Banyard v. NLRB.7 5
The court concluded that the contractual arbitration process was
not a substitute or a prerequisite for NLRB resolution of statutory
issues because it would be illogical to defer to an arbitrator, who is
under no duty to consider the statutory issue, solely upon the basis
of an unsupported presumption. 6
In Atlantic Steel Co.,"7 the NLRB in 1979 began to tighten the
criteria for deferring to arbitration awards. The Board held that
even though it preferred that the arbitrator rule directly on the
unfair labor practice issue, the arbitrator had to, at a minimum,
"implicitly" resolve the issue by "considering" all the evidence rel-
evant to the unfair labor practice. 78 In Atlantic Steel Co., the arbi-
trator had not explicitly addressed the unfair labor practice issue.
However, the arbitrator did make the necessary findings of fact for
resolving the issue. Ruling that the arbitration award was not re-
pugnant to the NLRA, the Board deferred to the award. 9
In the 1980 case of Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,80 the NLRB
tightened even further the criteria for deferring to arbitration
awards and overruled its decision in Electronic Reproduction as an
impermissible delegation of the Board's jurisdiction.81 The Board
would no longer defer to an arbitration award under Spielberg un-
less the unfair labor practice issue "was both presented to and con-
sidered by the arbitrator. ' e2 Electronic Reproduction did promote
the policy of encouraging collective bargaining relationships, but it
did so at the cost of derogation of the policy of protecting the em-
75. Id. at 540-41; see Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (adding a
"clearly decided" criterion to the Spielberg test).
76. 550 F.2d at 540-41.
77. 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
78. Id. at 815. In Raytheon, where the Board refused to defer, the record before the
"arbitrator was inadequate for resolving the unfair labor practice." Id.
79. Id. at 816-17.
80. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980). In overruling Electronic Reproduction, the NLRB rein-
stated the decisions of Airco and Yourga. Id. at 147. The Board concluded that it could "no
longer adhere to a doctrine which forces employees in arbitration proceedings to seek simul-
taneous vindication of private contractual rights and public statutory rights, or risk waiving
the latter." Id. at 146; see Truesdale, Recent Trends at the NLRB and in the Courts, 32
LAB. L.J. 131, 135 (1981) (the "second bite at the apple" concern is not serious because the
complainant will not purposely withhold unfair labor practice evidence and thus risk that
the Board will defer to the arbitration award; the normal scenario is that the employee,
through ignorance, will inadvertently fail to allege the unfair labor practice or fail to present
evidence at the arbitration proceeding).
81. 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.
82. Id. at 146-47.
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ployee's exercise of rights under section 7 of the NLRA. s3 Also, the
party seeking deferral would have the burden of proving that the
unfair labor practice issue was presented to and considered by the
arbitrator.8' In 1982, in Propoco5 the NLRB adhered to the Sub-
urban Motor Freight requirements that the unfair labor practice
must be presented to and considered by the arbitrator. In Propoco,
the unfair labor practice issue was not presented to or considered
by the arbitrator. 86 The Board also rejected the view that "Subur-
ban Motor Freight's requirements are satisfied whenever the con-
tractual and unfair labor practice issues are factually parallel and
the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice issue." 87Thus, the deferral pol-
icy was further restricted so that the scenario in Atlantic Steel
would no longer result in deferral to the arbitration award.
In 1984, realizing that the role of arbitration was being dimin-
ished, the NLRB in Olin Corporationa reexamined its policy on
deferral to arbitration awards and adopted the standards an-
nounced in the dissenting opinion in Propoco.8 e The NLRB re-
turned to only that part of the Electronic Reproduction Service
standard that places upon the party seeking to block deferral the
burden of proving that the Board should ignore the arbitration
award.90 However, the Electronic Reproduction Service holding
that no more than an opportunity to present the unfair labor prac-
tice issue to the arbitrator was necessary for deferral treatment by
the Board remained overruled.9 1
The Board in Olin Corporation adopted three requirements for
deferring to arbitration awards. The first requirement, adopted
from Raytheon, is that the unfair labor practice issue must be ade-
quately considered by the arbitrator. This requirement is satisfied
when "(1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair
labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally
83. Id. at 146.
84. Id. at 147.
85. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co. (Propoco), 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982), af-
firmed, NLRB v. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 137.
87. Id. at 138. But see Truesdale, supra note 80, at 131, 136 (Suburban Motor Freight
did not require that the arbitrator explicity decide the unfair labor practice issue but only
required that the contractual issue be parallel to the statutory issue so that the arbitrator
implicity resolved the statutory issue when he resolved the contractual issue).
88. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
89. Id. at 574.
90. Id. at 574, 575 n.10.
91. Id. at 575 n.10.
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with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice." 92
Any differences in the contractual and statutory standards of re-
view will be included in the Board's determination under the
Spielberg standards of whether an award is "clearly repugnant" to
the NLRA. The second requirement is that under the "clearly re-
pugnant standard," the arbitration award is not required to be to-
tally consistent with NLRB precedent. The Board will defer "un-
less the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act."93 The third requirement is that the party
asking the Board not to defer, but to consider the merits, must
affirmatively demonstrate the defects in the arbitration process or
award by showing that the first and second requirements for defer-
ral have not been met.9 4
The NLRB has continued to follow the criteria given in the Olin
Corp. case for deferring to arbitration awards. In 1985, in Ohio
Edison Co.,95 the Board deferred to an arbitration award that met
the Spielberg criteria" and also met the criteria in Olin Corp. for
consideration of the unfair labor practice issue.9 7 In United Parcel
Service, Inc.,98 the Board followed its Olin Corp. decision by defer-
ring to an arbitration award because the party arguing against
deferral failed to demonstrate any deficiencies in the arbitral pro-
cess or award or that the award was "clearly repugnant to the
Act."9 9 The Board also held that whether it might have resolved
the statutory issue differently does not affect the validity of the
arbitration award. The Board reasoned "that the voluntary resolu-
tion of disputes promotes industrial peace and stability between
labor and management. . . . [A] refusal to defer could undercut
the purpose of the grievance mechanism and discourage the Union
and the [employer] from negotiating their differences and abiding
by their settlements. 1 °o
92. Id. at 574; see, e.g., Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 815 (1979); Kansas City
Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867 (1978) (in each case the Board determined that the unfair
labor practice issue was adequately considered by the arbitrator because his findings were
complete and factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue).
93. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
94. Id.
95. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1429 (1985).
96. Id. at 1430.
97. Id. at 1430 n.5.
98. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1414 (1985).
99. Id. at 1416.
100. Id. at 1417; see NLRB v. City Disposal Syss., Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). The
Supreme Court recognized that the principal tool by which an employee invokes the rights
granted him in a collective-bargaining agreement is the processing of a grievance according
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE NLRB's DEFERRAL POLICY
A. Judicial Acceptance of the NLRB's Policy of Deferring to
the Arbitration Process
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ' 01 pro-
vides the federal courts with authority to enforce collective-bar-
gaining agreements, but the United States Supreme Court has held
that where the agreement requires the use of arbitration to settle
disputes, the contractual grievance procedure must be exhausted
before the agreements may be enforced by federal courts.102 The
Supreme Court has sanctioned the contractual arbitration pro-
cess10 3 as the preferred method of preserving the industrial peace
mandated by Congress.1 04 In United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 10 5 the Court stated: "An order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscepti-
ble of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."1 0" In Ca-
rey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'1 7 the Court added that, while
to whatever procedures his contract establishes. The Supreme Court emphasized that "to
the extent that the factual issues raised in an unfair labor practice action have been, or can
be, addressed through the grievance process, the Board may defer to that process." Id. at
1515.
101.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
102. See, e.g., Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 104 S. Ct. 1844 (1984); Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965); United Elec. Workers v. Honey-
well, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
103. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (these three cases are known collectively as
the Steelworkers Trilogy; American Mfg. Co. and Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. involved
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate; Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. involved the
enforcement of an arbitration award); see also Lab. Rel. Expediter, supra note 13, at LRX-
16 (1983).
104. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1982). Congress has mandated that the "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement." Id.
105. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
106. Id. at 582-83.
107. 375 U.S. 261 (1964); see also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081-82 (1955)
(the NLRB may invoke its processes at any time the arbitration result is inconsistent with
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arbitration is more desirable for the settlement of labor disputes,
the NLRB at any time may invoke its authority over labor-man-
agement disputes.'0 8 However, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Mad-
dox,109 the Court stated that the courts will not hear complaints
from employees who have failed to utilize the contractual griev-
ance-arbitration procedure unless the contract specifically states
that the arbitration process is not the sole remedy. 10
In Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins,"' the Supreme
Court stated that the presumption of the Steelworkers Trilogy" 2
favoring arbitration is an "accepted rule of construction" of arbi-
tration clauses: "Such a presumption furthers the national labor
policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes and thus best ac-
cords with the parties' presumed objectives in pursuing collective
bargaining."I 3 The courts' only function in actions to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate is to determine whether an agreement to
arbitrate was made and whether the claim to be arbitrated falls
within the agreement's scope." 4 Thus, the Supreme Court not only
sanctions the NLRB's deferral but also requires the courts to defer
to the arbitration process when the parties to the collective bar-
gaining agreement have agreed in their contract to submit disputes
the standards set forth in Spielberg); NLRB v. International Union, United Auto. Workers
Local 291, 194 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1952) (an arbitration award in favor of a union does
not preclude the Board from thereafter finding that the union's conduct violated the
LMRA).
108. 375 U.S. at 272. See Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984)
("The presence of other means of resolving disputes, including arbitration, does not oust the
Board of jurisdiction."); NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126, 137 (7th Cir. 1955) (a
contractual arbitration remedy does not oust NLRB of jurisdiction to remedy an unfair
labor practice), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956), petition to vacate denied, 243 F.2d 168
(7th Cir. 1957).
Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982), states:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section [8 of this Act)) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise
109. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
110. Id. at 657-58; see also Vaca v. Sipes, 385 U.S. 895 (1967); United Elec. Workers v.
Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975) (in seeking to bypass the contract's arbitra-
tion clause, union was not entitled to an action in federal court based on Taft-Hartley Act §
301).
111. 104 S.Ct. 1844 (1984).
112. See supra note 103.
113. 104 S.Ct. at 1849 (citation omitted).
114. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-85;
see also Lab. Rel. Expediter, supra note 13, at LRX-21.
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to arbitration.1 1 5
As opposed to disputes involving the NLRA, disputes involving
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)" 6 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964117 will not be deferred to arbitration.
Rather than require deferral to the contractual arbitration proce-
dures, the Supreme Court has held that an individual is allowed to
maintain an action in federal court under these Acts because an
employee's congressionally-granted statutory rights are better pro-
tected in a judicial, rather than an arbitral, forum.1 ' While the
NLRA encourages employees to promote their interests collec-
tively, the FLSA and Title VII were intended to ensure that the
interests of each employee would be protected. 119 The rights of em-
ployees under the FLSA are independent of the collective bargain-
ing process. 120 The employee's right to a judicial determination is
not foreclosed by his failure to submit, or his prior submission of,
the dispute to final arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement.'21
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,122 the Supreme Court held
that in a Title VII action an individual employee may still main-
115. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974) (statutory
rights arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not deferrable).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
117. §§ 701-19, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
118. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), appeal after
remand, 750 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2116 (1985); Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For a discussion of how the Court's pronouncement in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. may undermine the stability of industrial relations by
refusing to accommodate the national labor policy on arbitration and by allowing "persons
claiming employment discrimination to seek relief in as many forums as they can find," see
Siegel, Deferral to Arbitration Awards in Title VII Actions, 25 LAB. L.J. 398, 402 (1974).
119. 450 U.S. at 739; 415 U.S. at 48, 52. Barrentine involved two aspects of the national
labor policy: (1) encouragement of the union and the employer to utilize the collective bar-
gaining process to negotiate terms and conditions of employment, and (2) the guarantee in
employer-employee relations of specific substantive rights to individual employees. The Su-
preme Court stated that when the parties (union and employer) to a collective bargaining
contract make an employee's substantive statutory rights subject to contractual arbitration
procedures, tension arises between the two policies. 450 U.S. at 734-35.
120. 450 U.S. at 745.
121. Id.; 415 U.S. 59-60; see also U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 356
(1971) (seaman's right under a 1790 federal statute to sue for wages due was not displaced
by the grievance arbitration provisions of the NLRA); Thompson v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.,
185 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1971) (an employee's failure to pursue contractual grievance arbitra-
tion procedures did not bar his action under the FLSA), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 228 (1972)
(Court declined to address whether the employee would be barred from pursuing the statu-
tory remedy because he might have filed a grievance on the basis of a contractual claim
arising out of the same event).
122. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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tain an action in federal court even though the employee filed the
lawsuit after having received an adverse decision from the arbitra-
tor.1 23 After the Court's decision in Gardner-Denver, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Satterwhite v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.,' 2' held that under the FLSA, unlike under Title VII,
an employee may not file a lawsuit for recovery, on the basis of the
same factual occurrence, when the employee has received an ad-
verse decision from final arbitration proceedings voluntarily en-
tered by the employee. 12 5 However, the Supreme Court in Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System' 2 has extended its Gardner-
Denver holding and overturned Satterwhite so that an individual
employee may maintain a court action under the FLSA even when
he has received an adverse decision from final arbitration proceed-
ings voluntarily entered by him and arising from the same event. 27
Whereas Gardner-Denver dealt with the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Supreme Court in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters
District Council'2 8 endorsed the NLRB's deferral policy enunci-
ated in Collyer regarding actions under the NLRA. The Court
stated that the NLRA requires, when appropriate, that the Board
defer to the voluntary settlement of disputes by the procedures
agreed upon in the collective-bargaining agreement.1 2
B. Judicial Acceptance of the Board's Deferral to Arbitration
Awards
In 1960, the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp.30 reasoned: "It is the arbitrator's con-
struction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the con-
tract is different from his."11 3 However, if the arbitrator fails to
base the award upon the collective bargaining agreement, then the
123. Id. at 47, 46 n.6. For a discussion of the effect of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
upon arbitration, see Hill, The Effects of Non-Deference on the Arbitral Institution: An
Alternative Theory, 28 LAB. L.J. 230 (1977).
124. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
125. Id. at 452.
126. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
127. Id. at 745.
128. 417 U.S. 12 (1974).
129. Id. at 17-18.
130. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
131. Id. at 599.
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arbitrator's award should not be enforced. 132 The courts of appeal
have followed the Supreme Court's lead by requiring the NLRB to
defer to the arbitration award although the Board would interpret
the contract differently than did the arbitrator who made the
award. 13 3 If the arbitrator's award meets the Spielberg require-
ments, then the NLRB must defer to the award.134  In Pincus
Brothers, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit added that
"where there are two arguable interpretations of an arbitration
award, one permissible and one impermissible, the Board must de-
fer to the decision rendered by the arbitrator.' ' 135 The Third Cir-
cuit held that the arbitrator's decision was thus not repugnant to
the NLRA and overturned the Board's refusal to defer. The Board
had ruled that the arbitrator's decision was repugnant to the
Act. '6 However, in Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals,37 the Third Cir-
cuit held that the NLRB correctly refused to defer to the arbitra-
tion award because the award failed to meet all the Spielberg re-
quirements for deferral.13 8 Earlier, in NLRB v. General Warehouse
Corp. '13 the Third Circuit had approved the four criteria that the
Board uses in its exercise of discretion to defer to arbitration
awards.' 0 In Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals, the arbitrator's deci-
sion was clearly repugnant to the policies of the NLRA, and the
arbitrator did not clearly decide the unfair labor practice issue.
The court thus indicated its adherence to the rule that deferral is
132. Id.
133. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Div. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (3d Cir. 1983);
Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB (Charmer Indus.), 664 F.2d 318, 326 (2d Cir.
1981); NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1981); Arco-
Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982);
NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 1980).
134. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Div., 722 F.2d at 1125-26; Liquor Salesmen's Union
Local 2, 664 F.2d at 326; General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d at 969-70; Pincus Brothers,
Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 374.
In General Warehouse Corp., the Third Circuit approved the three standards set forth by
the NLRB in Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), for deferring to arbi-
trators' awards: (1) the proceedings have been fair and regular; (2) the parties agreed to be
bound; and (3) the decision was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
National Labor Relations Act. The court also approved the fourth criterion given by the
Board in Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), that the Board would refuse to defer to an
arbitrator's decision if the arbitrator failed to consider and decide the unfair labor practice
issue. 643 F.2d at 968-69.
135. 620 F.2d at 377 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 375.
137. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Div. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 1126.
139. 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981).
140. Id. at 968-69.
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not proper unless the arbitrator has decided the unfair practice is-
sue. However, the court stated: "This is not a case in which the
existence of the unfair labor practice depends on interpretation of
the contract, and in which the Board has disregarded the arbitra-
tor's interpretation."14
In the 1979 case of Servair, Inc. v. NLRB,142 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the NLRB had improperly
refused to defer to the arbitrator's award when the contractual is-
sue and the unfair labor practice issue were essentially the same. 143
The court set forth three guidelines for the Board to follow in de-
ferring to arbitration awards: (1) if only statutory violations are
alleged, the Board should not defer to the arbitration award; (2) if
only violations of the collective bargaining agreement are alleged,
the Board should defer to the arbitration award; and (3) if the al-
leged contractual violation is capable of being alleged as a statu-
tory breach and if the arbitrator's resolution of the contractual
breach also resolves the underlying issues of statutory breach, then
the Board should respect the arbitrator's judgment. 14 4 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Carey v. General Electric
Co.143 held that a court must order arbitration (as long as the con-
tract provides for arbitration) even if the employee in his grievance
action is seeking to enforce an unfair labor practice. The question
of whether the arbitrator's award compels an unfair labor practice
is to be resolved after, not before, the arbitrator renders an
award. 14
Most circuits have ruled that, in certain situations, the NLRB
abuses its discretion when it fails to defer to an arbitrator's
award.1 47 In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB,1 48 the Ninth Circuit
held that if there are two possible interpretations of the reasoning
for the arbitrator's award, one permissible and the other impermis-
141. 722 F.2d at 1126.
142. 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2705 (9th Cir. 1979), opinion withdrawn and remanded, 624
F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 2709; see also ILINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, LABOR
LAW FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 7.18, at 7-19 (1980).
144. 102 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
145. 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964).
146. Id. at 507-08, 512.
147. American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Richmond
Tank Car Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d
734 (4th Cir. 1982); Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB (Charmer Indus.), 664 F.2d
318 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982); NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell,
620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
148. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
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sible, then the Board may not rule that the award is clearly repug-
nant to the NLRA. 119 In NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Max-
well, °50 the Third Circuit concluded that the national policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes gives priority to the societal
rewards of arbitration over "a need for uniformity of result or a
correct resolution of the dispute in every case."' 51 In concluding
that the arbitrator need not state that "his resolution of the con-
tractual dispute is intended as a resolution of the statutory issue as
well," the- Second Circuit in Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v.
NLRB 5 2 reasoned that when "the contractual and statutory issues
rest on the same factual determinations, the arbitrator's better po-
sition and expertise as a factfinder strengthen the case" for defer-
ring to the arbitrator's award. 5 3
Some circuit court decisions have required the arbitrator to have
"clearly decided" the unfair labor practice issue. In Stephenson v.
NLRB, 54 the Ninth Circuit held that the NLRB must not defer to
an arbitration award merely on a presumption, with no evidence,
that the unfair labor practice issue was resolved by the arbitra-
tor. 55 The decision by the arbitrator must deal specifically with
the unfair labor practice issue:
Merely because the arbitrator is presented with a problem which
involves both contractual and unfair labor practice elements does
not necessarily mean that he will adequately consider the statu-
tory issue, and merely because he considers the statutory issue
does not mean that he will enforce the rights of the parties pursu-
ant to and consistent with the Act. 58
In NLRB v. Magnetics International, Inc.,57 the Sixth Circuit,
also concluding that the arbitrator must consider and decide all
149. Id. at 354; see also Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d at 377.
150. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 374.
152. 664 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1981).
153. Id. at 325. Although the arbitrator did not expressly resolve the statutory issues, his
express resolution of the contractual issue was "necessarily dispositive of the statutory is-
sue," in that if no contractual violation occurred, then no statutory violation occurred.
"Under these circumstances, to insist here that the arbitrator announce that his resolution
of the contractual dispute is intended as a resolution of the statutory issue as well is to
impose a purely formalistic requirement. Thus, we decide that the Board's 'clearly decided'
criterion was met in substance ...." Id.
154. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
155. Id. at 539.
156. Id. at 538 n.4.
157. 699 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1983).
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unfair labor practice issues, stated that the courts will not "specu-
late about what the arbitrator . . . considered.' 1 58 In United Par-
cel Service v. NLRB,159 the Third Circuit stated that some evi-
dence that the arbitrator actually decided the statutory issues
must be present; otherwise, the deferral policy of the Board would
be one of abdication. 60 However, in 1984, slightly modifying its
earlier stance, the Ninth Circuit in Servair, Inc. v. NLRB' 6' held
that when the resolution of the contractual issue by the arbitrator
is dispositive of the statutory issue, deferral to the arbitrator's
award may accomplish the purposes of the NLRA "even where the
arbitrator does not explicitly address the statutory issue. . . . Ac-
cordingly, where the issue was not clearly decided, deferral may
still be appropriate if the resolution of the statutory issue is depen-
dent upon the resolution of the contractual issue. "162
The Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc.,163 did not
appear to require evidence that the arbitrator had resolved the un-
fair labor practice issue when the contractual issue was identical to
the statutory issue in order for the Board to defer to the arbitra-
tor's award. The court reasoned that the resolution of the contrac-
tual issue resolved the statutory issue. 64 To defer would motivate
employees to not
submit unfair labor practice charges to arbitration as provided in
their collective bargaining agreements. Instead, during an arbitra-
tion proceeding, an employee would not assert a possible unfair
labor practice charge but hold it in reserve for 'appeal' to the Na-
158. Id. at 811.
159. 706 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), judgment vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 419 (1983).
160. 706 F.2d at 981; see also NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.
1981). In General Warehouse Corp., both the employer and the union raised the unfair
labor practice issue before the arbitrator, but the arbitrator did not explicitly address it in
his decision. Because no evidence was presented that the arbitrator had decided the unfair
labor practice issue, the Third Circuit ruled that the NLRB is required to refuse deferral
and to determine the unfair labor practice issue itself. If the Board were to defer without
some evidence that the arbitrator decided the statutory issue, the NLRB's deferral policy
would be one of abdication. Id. at 969-71. However, Judge Aldisert, dissenting, argued that
the proper way to interpret any arbitration award is to assume, absent some substantial
countervailing indication, that the arbitrator properly resolved the dispute. Id. at 975. The
Ninth Circuit, in Stephenson, had earlier rejected this argument and concluded that the
NLRB should not defer to an arbitrator, who is under no obligation to consider the statu-
tory issue, solely upon the presumption that the arbitrator had considered the issue. 550
F.2d at 539-40.
161. 726 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 1441 (citation omitted).
163. 673 F.2d 734 (4th Cir. 1982).
164. Id. at 736.
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tional Labor Relations Board in case of an adverse ruling. Arbi-
tration would become nothing more than a costly extra step in
the march to federal court rather than the cost efficient and rapid
resolution of disputes it is designed to be.1 5
Holding the NLRB to its deferral policy developed under
Spielberg, the court agreed that the Board is allowed to change
that deferral policy, but, until it does, the Board must defer when
the Spielberg guidelines are met.1 66
The Second Circuit in Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 has
taken a stronger stance in restricting the NLRB's discretion to
change the circumstances under which it will defer to arbitration.
The Second Circuit agrees that the Board is not required by stat-
ute to defer. 167 However, the court believes that if the Board is
allowed to ignore its announced deferral standards or to change
the rules on a case by case basis, then the "laboriously developed
standards of deference" would be rendered "virtually meaningless,
depriving parties to collective bargaining agreements of a reasona-
ble expectation of finality in properly conducted arbitrations and
significantly undermining the value and efficacy of arbitration as
an alternative to the judicial or administrative resolution of labor
disputes."168
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International
Union 25 v. NLRB169 approved the Board's rulings in Olin Corp.1 7
0
and Spielberg1 7 1 on deferring to arbitration awards. In this case,
the contractual issue presented to the arbitrator was parallel to the
unfair labor practice issue. 17  The D.C. Circuit held that the
NLRB's deferral to the arbitrator's decision was properly within
the Board's discretion because the arbitrator's decision was not
clearly repugnant to the NLRA,'7 3 as resolution of the contractual
issue would resolve the unfair labor practice issue, 4 and because
the Spielberg standards for deferral had been met. 17 5 The court
165. Id. at 736-37.
166. Id. at 736.
167. 664 F.2d at 326.
168. Id. at 327.
169. 730 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
171. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
172. 730 F.2d at 815.
173. Id. at 816.
174. Id. at 815.
175. Id. at 816.
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also approved the Board's statement in Olin Corp. that as long as
the arbitrator's decision is susceptible to an interpretation consis-
tent with the NLRA, the Board should defer. 176
Also in 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.'7 held that the NLRB did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to defer to an arbitrator's
award when the arbitrator expressly refused to resolve the unfair
labor practice issue. 178 The court cited Olin Corp. but did not dis-
cuss whether the Board's decision to defer followed the criteria set
forth in that case. The court also did not state its opinion on the
deferral policy adopted by the Board in Olin Corp.179
IV. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NLRB's
POLICY
Former NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller'"0 has stated that
Olin Corp. and United Technologies, which indicated that the
Board would give greater deference to the arbitration process and
arbitration awards, were not "a large break from past Board
law"'' but were a return to a policy similar to the Collyer doctrine
of deferral to the arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining
agreement. Mr. Miller stated, however, that the Board has adopted
a stricter standard for deferral than it did in the early 1970's. The
NLRB's deferral policy is "neither pro-union nor pro-company,
but rather one of granting greater or lesser effect to agreements
between companies and unions to arbitrate . . . . [T]he current
Board is more willing to trust the judgment of arbitrators than
were the members who served on the Board in 1977.' 2 Peter
Nash, former NLRB General Counsel, also believes that the
Board's policy, clarified in Olin Corp. and United Technologies
Corp., on deferring to the arbitration proceedings within the col-
lective bargaining agreement and to arbitration awards "is neither
pro-management nor pro-union." Mr. Nash reasons that "[it
makes sense for NLRB to tell the parties to abide by the arbitra-
176. Id. at 815.
177. 736 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1984).
178. Id. at 1414.
179. Id. at 1413.
180. Edward Miller served as the NLRB chairman from 1970-1974. Defense of NLRB's
Performance, [News & Background Info.] 116 LAB. ReL. REP. (BNA) 103 (1984).
181. Id. at 104.
182. Id. (quoting Edward Miller's remarks at the May 29, 1984, meeting of the Chicago
Ass'n of Commerce and Industry's Labor-Management Relations Committee).
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tion procedure in a collective bargaining agreement under the
[NLRA], which encourages collective bargaining. 111 3
In 1984, the Office of General Counsel for the NLRB issued
memoranda' 4 stating that the Board in its decisions in United
Technologies Corp. and Olin Corp. did not change its deferral pol-
icy but only extended the deferral doctrine to include not only al-
leged violations of NLRA section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), but also of
section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2). The Office of Gen-
eral Counsel is taking the approach that the NLRB did not other-
wise change the law of deferral and that the existing substantive
and procedural law for deferring to the arbitration process or the
arbitration award should continue to be applied.'8 5 In disputes al-
leging violations of these sections, the Board will hold the case in
abeyance until "the parties use their grievance-arbitration machin-
ery to resolve their dispute."'18
When the NLRB is presented with an employer-union dispute
involving contractual and statutory issues, it must decide whether
to order contractually-provided grievance arbitration, to defer to a
previously issued arbitration award, or to administratively resolve
the issues itself.187 The central issue for the Board to resolve in the
development of its deferral policy is whether deferral of unfair la-
bor practice issues both optimizes labor peace and protects em-
ployees' statutory rights. 188 There are several arguments in favor of
deferral to the internal settlement of disputes through the parties'
contractual arbitration provisions: (1) encouragement of the use of
a mutually formulated procedure for resolution of disputes,
thereby improving the collective bargaining process and labor-
183. Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB Policy Reversals, [News & Background Info.] 116 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 142, 144 (1984) (quoting Peter Nash, member of a conference panel at New
York University's 37th Annual National Conference on Labor, June 7, 1984).
184. NLRB Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 84-5, [News & Background
Info.] 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 334 (1984) (March 6, 1984, guideline memorandum from
General Counsel William A. Lubbers to Regional Directors regarding deferral of unfair labor
practice cases in light of the Board's 1984 decision in United Technologies Corp.); NLRB
Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 84-10, [News & Background Info.] 116 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 166 (1984) (June 7, 1984, guideline memorandum from Acting General
Counsel Wilford W. Johansen to Regional Directors concerning deferral to arbitration
awards in light of the Board's 1984 decision in Olin Corp.).
185. [News & Background Info.] 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 334; [News & Background Info.]
116 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 166.
186. [News & Background Info.] 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 334 & n.1.
187. Hayford & Wood, Deferral to Grievance Arbitration In Unfair Labor Practice
Matters: The Public Sector Treatment, 32 LAB. L.J. 679, 680 (1981).
188. Id. at 691.
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management relations;189 (2) encouragement of the voluntary reso-
lution of disputes; 190 (3) achievement of a more acceptable resolu-
tion in shorter time by basing the award upon shop law and the
parties' mutually agreed-upon contract; 9' (4) conservation of re-
sources of the parties by foreclosing the presentation of the same
issue before two different tribunals and of resources of the NLRB
by reducing the case load of the Board to allow more time to
devote to significant issues; s2 and (5) skill and expertise of the ar-
bitrator which are superior to those of the Board and the courts in
terms of industry and shop practices that are an unwritten part of
the collective bargaining agreement. 93
Critics claim that the benefits derived from the NLRB's deferral
of unfair labor practice issues to arbitration are outweighed by
negative consequences. Several arguments are presented in opposi-
tion to deferral: (1) abdication by the NLRB of the obligation
placed upon it by Congress to resolve statutory issues,'194 (2) un-
remedied violations for parties refusing to arbitrate because of the
substantial expense,195 (3) the limited scope of review in arbitra-
tion preventing full treatment of statutory matters by the arbitra-
tor,"9 ' (4) inadequate remedies available in arbitration to ensure
full redress of unfair labor practice violations, 19 (5) incapability of
arbitrators to interpret statutory language and legal precedent
with only blatantly erroneous applications of the law being cor-
rected by the courts, 98 and (6) subordination of the rights of the
individual to the relationship between labor and management. 99
189. See General American Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 816 (1977) (Members
Penello and Walther, dissenting); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1971); id.
at 844 (Member Brown, concurring).
190. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 531 (1972).
191. See Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB (Charmer Indus.), 664 F.2d 318, 325
(2d Cir. 1981); General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 818-19 (Members Penello and
Walther, dissenting).
192. See NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 734, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1982).
193. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960); Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2, 664 F.2d at 325; Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. at 839.
194. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Novack, Cutting Back on
Collyer: The First Step in the Right Direction, 28 LAB. L.J. 785, 793 (1977).
195. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 813 (Chairman Murphy, concur-
ring); Hayford & Wood, supra note 187, at 681.
196. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 811 (Chairman Murphy,
concurring).
197. See id. at 813 (Chairman Murphy, concurring); Novack, supra note 194, at 790.
198. See Stephenson, 550 F.2d at 538 n.4; Hayford & Wood, supra note 187, at 681-82.
199. See Novack, supra note 194, at 791.
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While some commentators believe that the NLRB should only
defer to arbitration disputes that can be determined solely on the
contract,0 0 former NLRB member John Penello believes that the
Board should not become involved with disputes over trivial issues
or with disputes that have been resolved fairly and equitably by
the parties themselves under a collective-bargaining agreement. 0 1
When the parties have had a stable collective-bargaining relation-
ship, refusal by the Board to defer to the arbitration decision not
only damages the collective-bargaining relationship but also con-
sumes the NLRB's scarce resources that could be better spent else-
where. The Board should not give a claimant a second chance to
prevail when an issue has been resolved pursuant to the arbitration
procedure within a collective-bargaining agreement.20 2
After the NLRB's decision in United Technologies, the Office of
General Counsel for the NLRB issued a memorandum explaining
the guidelines to be followed for deferral to the arbitration pro-
cess.20 8 Alleged violations of section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5),
8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(1)(B), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA should be
deferred to the contractual arbitration procedure if the case is ap-
propriately deferrable. The memorandum sets out the require-
ments for a dispute to be deemed "appropriately deferrable." First,
the grievance-arbitration provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement should "clearly encompass" the unfair labor practice is-
sue. 20 4 Second, the party requesting the NLRB to defer must be
willing to arbitrate the unfair labor practice issue.20 5 Third, the use
of the grievance-arbitration procedures must not appear to be fu-
tile, as when a party's conduct demonstrates a rejection of the
principles of collective bargaining. As long as the grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures are workable and the parties freely resort to the
procedures, the dispute should be deferred to arbitration. Fourth,
the past relationship between the parties must be balanced with
the parties' current collective bargaining relationship to determine
whether the grievance-arbitration machinery can reasonably be ex-
pected to properly resolve the current unfair labor practice issue.200
200. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 813 (Chairman Murphy, concur-
ring); Novack, supra note 194, at 799.
201. Penello, The NLRB's Misplaced Priorities, 30 LAB. L.J. 3, 3 (1979).
202. Id. at 5.
203. NLRB Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 84-5, [News & Background
Info.] 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 334 (1984).
204. Id. at 344.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 335.
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Fifth, if the allegation is filed by an individual employee alleging a
violation of section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), or 8(b)(2), then the
dispute should be deferred. If the union lawfully refuses to process
the grievance or if the interests of the union are adverse to those of
the employee, then the NLRB should not defer because "a refusal
by the Board to entertain the unfair labor practice case would be a
denial of the employee's right to seek redress for a statutory wrong,
and such denial would be an abdication of the Board's public re-
sponsibility to provide an avenue for redressing statutory
wrongs."20 7
The memorandum further states that the NLRB should consider
deferral to the arbitration procedures regardless of whether the
dispute has been presented to arbitration. However, when the dis-
pute reaches the administrative law judge, the request for deferral
must be made before the administrative hearings are closed; other-
wise, the dispute will not be deferred. 0 The memorandum con-
cludes by stating that the United Technologies Corp. decision only
extended the scope of the unfair labor practice cases to which the
Board will defer but did not change the deferral principles existing
prior to that case.20 9
The Office of General Counsel also issued a memorandum outlin-
ing the guidelines to be followed by the NLRB in deferring to arbi-
tration awards under the Olin Corp. decision.210 The General
Counsel set forth the same guidelines as expressed by the Board in
Olin Corp. for deferral to arbitration awards. First, the proceedings
must have been fair and regular. Second, the parties must have
agreed to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator. Third, the
arbitrator's decision must not be clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the NLRA.21 1 Even though the arbitration award is
not required to be totally consistent with the Board's precedent,
the award will be repugnant to the Act when the arbitrator's deci-
sion is not susceptible of an interpretation consistent with the
Act.21 2 Fourth, the arbitrator must have adequately considered the
unfair labor practice issue. If the contractual issue is factually par-
allel to the statutory issue and the facts relevant to resolving the
207. Id. at 336.
208. Id. at 336-37.
209. Id. at 337.
210. NLRB Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 84-10, [News & Back-
ground Info.] 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 166 (1984).
211. Id. at 166.
212. Id. at 167.
19861 1167
1168 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1141
statutory issue are presented to the arbitrator, the arbitrator will
be assumed to have adequately considered the statutory issue.2"3
Fifth, the party requesting the NLRB to reject deferral has the
burden of proving that these criteria for deferral have not been
satisfied.214
V. CONCLUSION
The NLRB and the courts have made the policy decision that
the arguments in support of deferral to arbitration override the ar-
guments opposing deferral. The first four arguments mentioned
above215 criticizing this policy are not significant. However, the
fifth and the sixth criticisms21 ' are concerns that are legitimately
raised by the deferral procedure. If the arbitrators do not become
better versed in statutory interpretation and legal precedent, then
the collective and individual rights of employees will be sacrificed
for the convenience of the NLRB and for the maintenance of a
stable relationship between unions and employers. The NLRA it-
self represents a decision by Congress to exalt the collective rights
of employees over the individual rights of an employee in order to
reach the congressional objective of industrial stability and peace.
Therefore, Congress itself has ruled out the sixth criticism as a ba-
sis for opposing deferral.
If the union, as the representative of the employees, breaches its
duty of fair representation and refuses to present the employee's
grievance before an arbitrator or inadequately represents the em-
ployee, then a safety valve is available to the employee which al-
lows him to take the grievance before the Regional Director of the
NLRB.2 17 Of course, the union has the responsibility to screen em-
213. Id. at 166.
214. Id. at 167.
215. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. The following are the first four
criticisms advanced: (1) abdication by the NLRB of the obligation placed upon it by Con-
gress to resolve statutory issues, (2) unremedied violations for parties refusing to arbitrate
because of the substantial expense, (3) the limited scope of review in arbitration preventing
full treatment of statutory matters by the arbitrator, and (4) inadequate remedies available
in arbitration to ensure full redress of unfair labor practice violations.
216. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text. The fifth criticism is that arbitra-
tors are incapable of interpreting the statutory language and legal precedent and that only
blantantly erroneous applications of the law will be corrected by the courts. The sixth criti-
cism is that the rights of the individual will be subordinated to the relationship between
labor and management.
217. See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965); ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, LABOR LAW
FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER §§ 7.17, 14.47-.50 (1980).
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ployee complaints before attempting to resolve them with manage-
ment and to dispose of complaints that are petty or unfounded.218
The past instability in the NLRB's incipient deferral policy was
a part of a process of experimentation to determine which would
be the best standards to further the objectives of the NLRA. The
courts helped the Board in this process of formulating a deferral
policy by defining the boundaries beyond which the Board could
not go and also by supporting the deferral standards which were
within its authority. Even though the past uncertainty as to which
alleged unfair labor practices the Board would defer to arbitration
and the requirements which it would impose could have caused
problems with the construction of and compliance with the arbi-
tration provisions of collective-bargaining agreements between un-
ions and management, no such difficulties appear to have material-
ized. The current deferral policy appears to have become stabilized
within the Board and is receiving full support in the federal cir-
cuits and in the United States Supreme Court. Parties entering
collective-bargaining agreements may safely depend on the current
policy to remain stable. Arbitration provisions in those agreements
may be structured and applied with the deferral policy in mind.
The NLRB's policy of deferral to the arbitration process, as ex-
plained in United Technologies Corp. and of deferral to the arbi-
tration award, as explained in Olin Corp., is being followed by the
current Board. The circuit courts and the United States Supreme
Court have concurred with the current Board's policy. Thus, it ap-
pears that the NLRB and the courts are relying on the collective
bargaining agreements between unions and employers for the en-
forcement of certain statutory rights of the employees. This defer-
ence to mutually agreed-upon contractual procedures places
greater burdens upon the arbitration process to ensure that em-
ployee's rights are not violated by either the employer or the
union. The arbitrators will also have to become more proficient in
interpreting the appropriate statutes and applying the Board's and
the courts' precedent. Of course, the resulting reduction in the
NLRB's case load should free its resources so that the Board can
be more productive in resolving other pressing disputes between
labor and management.
218. See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. at 190-93.
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